The enemy in the mail -:- Seven steps to securing your mailroom

Source: Security News Portal - SNPortal.

There are a number of relatively inexpensive steps that can be taken to fight the bio-terrorism war that is currently being waged through the US mail. The issue is one of containing possible contaminants and minimising the potential for damage. "Nothing can prevent the possibility of a terrorist hell-bent on forwarding a suspicious substance in the mail," says John Puskar, P.E., principal of CEC Consultants.

"However, if you follow the seven steps outlined below you can minimise the potential for damage, possibly save an entire building from millions of dollars in clean-up costs, and most importantly, you can save lives."

The enemy in the mail

1. Centralised mail opening with special exhaust
Suspicious mail should be opened only by a limited number of individuals while using an exhaust booth. The concept is to move air past the user and sweep contaminants into a holding chamber away from the opener. Discharge air from the system can be routed to a 99.99 per cent efficient filter and disinfection chamber.

Consideration must be given as to how filters will get changed since the filters must be treated as contaminated unless tests prove otherwise. Also, if airflows are not correct and turbulence occurs at the hood face or when the hood is occupied, the worker would be at even greater risk than if no hood at all was used. A strict field-testing protocol must be established for these kinds of speciality hood designs.

2. Isolate the mail path
Consider where the mail collection, sorting, and storage areas are with respect to building traffic and air intakes. Where air is returned to an air-handler from a mail receiving and/or storage and sorting operation, consider disconnecting it from the main recirculated system and exhausting only from this area. In doing this the space can be maintained negative with respect to the rest of the building. This will tend to keep contaminants confined to a specific area.

Remember, it's not necessarily the active anthrax or any other bio-agent that can be deadly, it's the spores. Spores are like little pods that contain the material in a dormant mode. Spores can live for hundreds of years under all kinds of adverse conditions. Once an area is contaminated with spores it may never be totally clean. Spores can come back to life and actively infect under the right conditions. If the potential for a building to be contaminated is limited, so can the potential for a multimillion-dollar clean up or even for a building to be rendered useless.

3. Personnel protection issues
It is important to consider who has handled the mail and their condition. People with compromised immune systems will face a greater risk for any kind of pathogen. Those who are already involved in some type of treatment, possibly chemotherapy, smokers, and/or the elderly, can have the most trouble recovering from an infection.

Personal protective gear is also a good idea. Respirators and disposable clothing and gloves can help to keep materials out of breathing zones and off the skin. If this type of protection is to be used, it should be considered part of an overall hygiene program that includes training, respirator fit testing, and decontamination procedures. It is not safe to simply buy respirators and start using them. Respirators decrease breathing capacity and people cannot do as much heavy work and/or breathe as effectively with them on.

4. Air distribution disinfection
As a back-up plan, disinfection systems are available that use special devices installed in air handlers that recirculate air to kill bacteria and other airborne pathogens. It would make sense to install these on air handlers that service mail areas and or ones that can impact large areas of a facility.

5. Limiting air distribution access
Action needs to be taken to rethink risks that central air handling systems can create. Air handling systems and mechanical rooms must now be looked at as not only a means to keep tempered air circulated but also as a means to communicate contaminants.

New levels of security should be considered such as re-keying mechanical rooms, alarming doors, and restricting access. Building personnel should also be observant of packages or devices left near return air grilles. These grilles are the main means for air discharged from an air handling system to return to it. These parts of an air handling system can get contaminants entrained and redistributed within minutes.

Installation of sensors for chemical detection should also be considered. These could shut down air handlers if certain substances were detected. These sensors may be able to tie into some of the existing fire or control systems depending on the age and type of the systems.

6. Sterilisation measures
Sterilisation chambers may be an option where the general public handles mail and/or other materials. Sterilisation of mail or other publicly accessed and widely distributed commodities, such as cash, could occur through Ethylene Oxide sterilisers and through the use of irradiation chambers such as those proposed for use on food during e-coli outbreaks. Although some contaminants may survive sterilisation efforts, live bacteria would most likely not.

7. Emergency plans/operating scenarios
Include a written description of how the building's air-handling systems work in the emergency plan. Identify main shut-offs and procedures for shutting down and starting up. Security personnel should be empowered and have the means to shut down air handlers immediately upon the occurrence of suspicious events. It should be remembered that typical air handling systems deliver one cubic foot of air per minute, per square foot of floor area. A typical room with an 8-foot ceiling would have its entire volume displaced in about eight minutes.