Dan Kamsinky On The RSA SecurID Compromise
Authentication failures are getting us owned. Our standard technology for auth, passwords, fail repeatedly — but their raw simplicity compared to competing solutions drives their continued use. SecurID is the most successful post-password technology, with over 40 million deployed devices. It achieved its success by emulating passwords as closely as possible. This involved generating key material at RSA’s factory, a necessary step that nonetheless created the circumstances that allowed a third party compromise at RSA to affect customers like Lockheed Martin.
There are three attack vectors that these hackers are now able to leverage — phishing attacks, compromised nodes, and physical monitoring of traveling workers. SecurID users however are at no greater risk of sharing passwords, a significant source of compromise.
I recommend replacing devices in an orderly fashion, possibly while increasing the rotation rate of PINs. I dismiss concerns about source compromise on the grounds that both hardware and software are readily reversed, and anyway we didn’t change operational behavior when Windows or IOS source leaked. RSA’s communications leave a lot to be desired, and even though third party security dependencies are tolerable, it’s unclear (even with claims of a “shiny new HSM”) whether this particular third party security dependency should be tolerated.
- Fri, 2013-03-01 14:51
- Thu, 2013-01-31 00:55
- Thu, 2013-01-03 08:54